Title: IND-CCA Secure Hybrid Encryption from QC-MDPC Niederreiter Authors: Ingo von Maurich, Lukas Heberle, and Tim Güneysu 7th International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography PQCrypto 2016 https://pqcrypto2016.jp/program/ Proceedings http://www.springer.com/jp/book/9783319293592
Views: 351 PQCrypto 2016
IQC member Fang Song presented a talk titled: A Note on Quantum Security for Post-Quantum Cryptography at the 2014 PQCrypto conference in October, 2014. Abstract: Shor's quantum factoring algorithm and a few other efficient quantum algorithms break many classical crypto-systems. In response, people proposed post-quantum cryptography based on computational problems that are believed hard even for quantum computers. However, security of these schemes against quantum attacks is elusive. This is because existing security analysis (almost) only deals with classical attackers and arguing security in the presence of quantum adversaries is challenging due to unique quantum features such as no-cloning. This work proposes a general framework to study which classical security proofs can be restored in the quantum setting. Basically, we split a security proof into (a sequence of) classical security reductions, and investigate what security reductions are "quantum-friendly". We characterize sufficient conditions such that a classical reductions can be "lifted" to the quantum setting. We then apply our lifting theorems to post-quantum signature schemes. We are able to show that the classical generic construction of hash-tree based signatures from one-way functions that are resistant to efficient quantum inversion algorithms, there exists a quantum-secure signature scheme. We note that the scheme in  is a promising (post-quantum) candidate to be implemented in practice and our result further justifies it. Actually, to obtain these results, we formalize a simple criteria, which is motivated by many classical proofs in the literature and is straight-forward to check. This makes our lifting theorem easier to apply, and it should be useful elsewhere to prove quantum security of proposed post-quantum cryptographic schemes. Finally we demonstrate the generality of our framework by showing that several existing works (Full-Domain hash in the quantum random-oracle model  and the simple hybrid arguments framework in ) can be reformulated under our unified framework. PQCrypto 2014 Book: http://www.springer.com/computer/security+and+cryptology/book/978-3-319-11658-7 Workshop: https://pqcrypto2014.uwaterloo.ca/ Find out more about IQC! Website - https://uwaterloo.ca/institute-for-qu... Facebook - https://www.facebook.com/QuantumIQC Twitter - https://twitter.com/QuantumIQC
Views: 903 Institute for Quantum Computing
Original post: https://www.gcppodcast.com/post/episode-123-post-quantum-cryptography-with-nick-sullivan-and-adam-langley/ Nick Sullivan, and Adam Langley join Melanie and Mark to provide a pragmatic view on post-quantum cryptography and what it means to research security for the potential of quantum computing. Post-quantum cryptography is about developing algorithms that are resistant to quantum computers in conjunction with “classical” computers. It’s about looking at the full picture of potential threats and planning on how to address them using a diversity of types of mathematics in the research. Adam and Nick help clarify the different terminology and techniques that are applied in the research and give a practical understanding of what to expect from a security perspective.
Views: 1155 Google Cloud Platform
This is an audio version of the Wikipedia Article: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-quantum_cryptography 00:01:45 1 Algorithms 00:01:59 1.1 Lattice-based cryptography 00:02:55 1.2 Multivariate cryptography 00:03:30 1.3 Hash-based cryptography 00:04:52 1.4 Code-based cryptography 00:05:42 1.5 Supersingular elliptic curve isogeny cryptography 00:06:54 1.6 Symmetric key quantum resistance 00:07:41 2 Security reductions 00:08:22 2.1 Lattice-based cryptography – Ring-LWE Signature 00:09:15 2.2 Lattice-based cryptography – NTRU, BLISS 00:09:55 2.3 Multivariate cryptography – Rainbow 00:10:29 2.4 Hash-based cryptography – Merkle signature scheme 00:11:19 2.5 Code-based cryptography – McEliece 00:11:49 2.6 Code-based cryptography – RLCE 00:12:19 2.7 Supersingular elliptic curve isogeny cryptography 00:12:53 3 Comparison 00:13:59 3.1 Lattice-based cryptography – LWE key exchange and Ring-LWE key exchange 00:15:27 3.2 Lattice-based Cryptography – NTRU encryption 00:16:10 3.3 Multivariate cryptography – Rainbow signature 00:16:52 3.4 Hash-based cryptography – Merkle signature scheme 00:17:18 3.5 Code-based cryptography – McEliece 00:23:35 3.6 Supersingular elliptic curve isogeny cryptography 00:24:41 3.7 Symmetric–key-based cryptography 00:25:26 4 Forward secrecy 00:26:50 5 Open Quantum Safe project 00:27:46 6 Implementation 00:28:18 7 See also Listening is a more natural way of learning, when compared to reading. Written language only began at around 3200 BC, but spoken language has existed long ago. Learning by listening is a great way to: - increases imagination and understanding - improves your listening skills - improves your own spoken accent - learn while on the move - reduce eye strain Now learn the vast amount of general knowledge available on Wikipedia through audio (audio article). You could even learn subconsciously by playing the audio while you are sleeping! If you are planning to listen a lot, you could try using a bone conduction headphone, or a standard speaker instead of an earphone. Listen on Google Assistant through Extra Audio: https://assistant.google.com/services/invoke/uid/0000001a130b3f91 Other Wikipedia audio articles at: https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=wikipedia+tts Upload your own Wikipedia articles through: https://github.com/nodef/wikipedia-tts "There is only one good, knowledge, and one evil, ignorance." - Socrates SUMMARY ======= Post-quantum cryptography (sometimes referred to as quantum-proof, quantum-safe or quantum-resistant) refers to cryptographic algorithms (usually public-key algorithms) that are thought to be secure against an attack by a quantum computer. As of 2018, this is not true for the most popular public-key algorithms, which can be efficiently broken by a sufficiently strong hypothetical quantum computer. The problem with currently popular algorithms is that their security relies on one of three hard mathematical problems: the integer factorization problem, the discrete logarithm problem or the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem. All of these problems can be easily solved on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer running Shor's algorithm. Even though current, publicly known, experimental quantum computers lack processing power to break any real cryptographic algorithm, many cryptographers are designing new algorithms to prepare for a time when quantum computing becomes a threat. This work has gained greater attention from academics and industry through the PQCrypto conference series since 2006 and more recently by several workshops on Quantum Safe Cryptography hosted by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and the Institute for Quantum Computing.In contrast to the threat quantum computing poses to current public-key algorithms, most current symmetric cryptographic algorithms and hash functions are considered to be relatively secure against attacks by quantum computers. While the quantum Grover's algorithm does speed up attacks against symmetric ciphers, doubling the key size can effectively block these attacks. Thus post-quantum symmetric cryptography does not need to differ significantly from current symmetric cryptography. See section on symmetric-key approach below.
Views: 16 wikipedia tts